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Abstract
We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also
about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases
as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status quo. We show that it is optimal
to publicly disclose both the experts contribution and his identity. Surprisingly, revealing the
intensity of the experts bias doesnt always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium.
The presence of a second expert raises the rst experts incentives to report truthfully when
reports are public, but reduces them when they are secret. In particular, having an option to call
another expert may be detrimental in terms of information production if reports are not public.
Finally, sequential consultation of experts reduces the information obtained when reports are
public, but raises it when they are secret.
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1 Introduction
In many economic environments, the information critical for decision making is not readily available,
but, instead, obtained from experts. A key issue is that experts could be biased, perhaps because
they have a nancial stake in the ultimate decision.
For instance, the mission of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is to monitor
and control the quality of health products. FDAs decisions are motivated through the advice
of advisory committees providing "independent expertise and technical assistance related to the
development and evaluation of products regulated by FDA.1" Most advisory committee members
are expert scientists who are often consultants for both the FDA and regulated industry. There has
been an increasing interest in the nancial conicts of interest of FDA advisory committee members
such as those for Vioxx, Levaquin, and Tysabri. (See, for instance, Angell, 2005; Cauchon, 2000;
Harris, 2006; Henderson, 2006.) To reduce those conicts of interests, committee members have to
complete a Condential Financial Disclosure Report on which they must disclose current and past
nancial interests related to the current case. Waivers may then be granted when the members
expertise is more valuable than the potential for a conict of interest.
Similarly, when evaluating a merger the Competition Authority must elicit the relevant infor-
mation from experts, often biased in favor of a concerned party. To mitigate this informational
problem, the European Competition Authority has recently decided to create its own team of eco-
nomic experts.2 Other examples of delegated expertise when some experts are biased are, among
others, stock recommendations by nancial analysts,3 the refereeing process of academic journals
or the evaluation of the impacts of climate change by scientic experts or environmental agencies.
This paper studies how those conicts of interests a¤ect the interactions between the experts
and the decision maker when the formers also care about their reputation on the market for experts.
We analyze the e¤ect of the expertise procedure on the e¢ ciency of information transmission. We
1Statement of Linda A. Suydam, Senior Associate Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration - Department
of Health and Human Services, before the House Committee on Government Reform on June 14, 2000.
2See Roller, Stennek and Verboven (2001), Kuhn (2002) and Rey (2003) for more details about European Com-
petition Authority decision.
3Bruce (2002) analyzes what causes analysts to have such a signicant bias in their recommendations. See also
Morgan and Stocken (2003) for a theoretical study of this point.
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focus on the nature of the informational linkage with the market for experts, when the information
provided by experts is veriable. In other words, experts provide evidence as opposed to opinions.
We develop a framework where a principal hires, at some xed wage, an outside expert, who
cares about his reputation, the social surplus, and also his own interests. For instance, he may have
common interests with a concerned party, the competitors or the consumers. Experts may gather
a private signal about the principals surplus, which is hard information. Thus the expert cannot
manipulate his signal, but he may conceal it. Within this framework, the principal will always
follow an experts advice when it is informative. Reputation e¤ects arise because the experts
ability to generate an informative signal is unknown and evidence of information gathering signals
this ability to the market. Such evidence may directly stems from disclosure of the experts reports
informativeness, or indirectly from its e¤ect on the decision.
We rst analyze the case in which the market perfectly observes the experts reports, identity
and bias, referred to as full transparency. If the experts bias is not too high, he will always report
the truth. But an expert may have incentives to misreport when his bias is high. Indeed, when
misreporting moves the decision toward his preferred one, the expert may conceal his information.
Less information is then transmitted when the bias moves toward a stronger preference for the
"status quo." We also show that misreporting is, to some extent, self-enforcing: the more the
market anticipates some misreporting, the higher the incentives to misreport.4 The reason is that
the reputation loss from not reporting decreases when the informed expert misreports more.
We then extend the model in several dimensions, corresponding to various aspects of expertise
procedures.
First we nd that it is not optimal to hide the identity of the expert nor the nature of his report.
The simple intuition is that limiting the public access to information would make misreporting less
costly for the expert in terms of reputation.
We then generalize the analysis in introducing uncertainty on the expertsbias. Surprisingly,
it is not always the case that transparency on the bias leads to more revelation of information.
The reason lies in the self-enforcing aspect of misreporting mentioned above. When the bias is
uncertain, the reputation loss for no report is independent of the bias, and for some intermediate
range of bias larger than if the bias was revealed leading to less misreporting. The overall e¤ect is
ambiguous and depends on the distribution of the bias.
4This creates the possibility of multiple equilibria even though we characterize necessary and su¢ cient conditions
under which a unique equilibrium exists.
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Finally, we examine multiple experts procedure, by allowing the principal to rely on two experts,
with di¤erent bias and quality of expertise, and to choose the timing of expertise (simultaneous or
sequential). In this set-up we show that under full transparency, the presence of a second expert
reduces the incentive of an expert to misreport. This is due to the fact that the probability that
an uninformed report moves the decision is reduced. In terms of information revealed, a procedure
with simultaneous expertise leads to more information revealed than one with sequential expertise,
although if the costs of expertise are high, the optimal timing may be the sequential one.
In a contrasting way, when expertsreports are secret, hiring a second expert reduces the rst
experts incentives to report his information. The intuition behind this result is that the signal
transmitted to the market on the expert is garbled if a second expert is hired, because the market
observer doesnt know which expert generated a decisive information. Caeteris paribus, hiring a
second expert is less attractive if the reports are secret compared to the case in which they are
public. In this case, the sequential timing dominates both in terms of information revelation and
costs of consultation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the base model which is solved under
full transparency in the following section. Section 5 analyzes the disclosure of information to
the market, while section 6 derives the equilibrium under imperfect information on the bias. The
procedure with multiple experts is discussed in section 7.
2 Related literature
This paper is at the frontier between two streams of literature on decision making with strategic
disclosure of information by interested (biased) parties: the literature focusing on veriable infor-
mation initiated by Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981), and the literature on the reputation of
experts initiated by Sobel (1985) or Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001). It shows how reputation e¤ects
the extent of "sanitazition" that the expert It points to an intricate relationship between the bias
of the expert and the
. In this persuasion game framework, Milgrom and Roberts (1986) show that strategic decision
makers are skeptical i.e. they consider any missing information as unfavorable. Moreover, there is
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full revelation of the information in the unique equilibrium. Shin (1994) shows that full revelation
does not survive to the introduction of uncertainty about the experts information. Dur and Swank
(2005) point out that it might be optimal to hire experts with bias di¤erent from the decision
maker in order to improve incentives to acquire information. We show in this paper that those
results are robust to the introduction of reputation on the experts side and to the limitation of the
information disclosed to the market for experts. Wolinsky (2003) discusses information transmission
without reputation e¤ects when the expertsbias are uncertain and when information is veriable
in the sense of Shin (1994). A biased expert reports less favorable information than when her bias
is known while we show that in all pure strategies equilibria, the most biased experts lie less with
uncertain bias.
The nearest antecedent to our paper is Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) who analyze the ad-
vantages of competing advocacies in an incomplete contract framework with veriable information.
They show that, in selecting two competing agents each collecting one signal rather than one gather-
ing two signals, the principal may improve the quality of decision-making by raising incentives. Our
paper deviates from theirs in that we dont model the expert incentives to generate the information
but only to divulge it. Moreover we assume that all experts gather the same information, which ts
for instance the case of medical expertise, or security expertise. Second, we analyze the e¢ ciency
of information transmission between the experts and the principal under di¤erent informational
features while Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) concentrate on the case of public reports.5
Information transmission between an interested expert and a decision maker also has been
studied by Kofman and Lawarree (1993) and Gromb and Martimort (2007) among others in a
mechanism design framework where information is contractible. Moreover, several authors have
analyzed the incentives of biased experts to misreport in cheap talk models.6 The main di¤erence
with our paper is that information is hard in our model even though it can be concealed. In our
motivating examples, the experts have to provide formal arguments when they send a report to the
decision maker and the decision maker cannot directly contract on the information provided by the
expert; that is the reason why we adopt this model specication.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that full reporting of information is impossible in cheap talk
models when an expert is biased. Krishna and Morgan (2001) and Li (2009) extend this result
5Beniers and Swank (2004) analyze the optimal composition of committees in a similar framework.
6This literature has been initiated by Crawford and Sobel (1982).
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and show that consulting two experts is better than consulting just one when experts are biased in
opposite directions. In this paper, we show that their result establishing that hiring two experts is
more e¢ cient than hiring only one is true exclusively in case reports are public. Specically, this
result cannot be generalized to the case of secret reports.
Sobel (1985) and Morris (2001) introduce reputation concerns in repeated cheap talk games.
However, in their model, reputation concerns are about the bias of the expert while in our model it
is about the quality of expertise. This reverses the e¤ects of reputation. In our model reputation
induces the expert to report the truth more often. We also share Ottaviani and Sorensens (2001,
2006a and 2006b) result that reputation concerns does not give in general the right incentives to
truthfully report information. However, we mitigate this result by accounting for some altruism
in the experts objective. In our model, the expert always report truthfully for low values of the
bias. The timing of consultation when experts care about their reputation is also analyzed by
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001). They show that reputation may lead to herding problems when
experts are consulted sequentially. In our model, this herding e¤ect does not exist because hard
information prevents experts to lie in order to appear correct and the optimal timing depends on
the informational structure.7
3 The model
A decision authority, hereafter the principal or she, has to make a decision d that can take two
values, d = 0 or d = 1: The principal is risk neutral. Her objective is to maximize the social
surplus,8 d:v; where v is unknown, with a nite and positive mean. Thus in the absence of any
information, the principal would choose d = 1, referred to as the status quo.
To reach an e¢ cient decision, the principal hires at some xed wage an expert. The expert
gathers an informative signal with some probability p; or no signal with probability 1   p. The
expert information is thus s 2 f;g[R where s = ; corresponds to no signal. When s 2 R; the signal
is informative and we denote  = E (v j s). In what follows we identify an informative signal with
the mean value of the status quo decision: s = : We assume that  is a parameter continuously
distributed on the real line, with a cumulative distribution function F and a density function f(:):
7See also Prendergast (1993).
8 In what follows we assume that the principal doesnt internalize the welfare of the expert. We develop in appendix
a model where the principal accounts for the experts utility that yields the same objective functions.
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Upon observing or not the signal, the expert makes a report r to the principal. The expert
cannot report that he has gathered an informative signal if it is not the case, nor report another
informative signal than the one he has gathered. In other words the informative signal is hard
information and can be transmitted to the authority. An interpretation for hard information is
that the principal requires a formal proof in order to validate the experts report; another is that
falsication of the information is prohibited by law and lying is therefore too costly for the expert.
However, an expert receiving an informative signal can hide this and choose not to report the value
of  by claiming the signal was uninformative.6 Such a strategy of removing bad news form reports
is refered to a as a "sanitization" strategy by Shin (1994). Thus the expert reports r 2 f;; sg:
It follows that when the expert transmits an informative signal r 6= ;, the optimal decision in
unambiguously to choose the decision that maximizes d:r We say in this case that the experts
report is decisive.
As an example, consider a pharmaceutical company that has conducted a rst clinical trial that
led to the posterior E (v) for the social value of a new treatment. The company obtains positive
prot if the treatment is introduced. An expert is asked to run a new trial, who may report
conclusive results or claim that the clinical trial failed to be conclusive. The expert is dependent
of the pharmaceutical company for some of his income and thus interested in the prot of this
company.
Another example would be an econometrician running a SSNIP test in a merger case, but
who is active in consulting and has some connexion with the industry. The econometrician may
then choose to report signicant estimates, or to report only a poor econompetrci study with no
signicant coe¢ cients.
The expert cares about social welfare but he is biased and receives a benet  when the decision
d = 1 is reached. We assume that the bias is known and will discuss the e¤ect of imperfect
information (transparency on the bias). The expert also cares about its reputation on the market
for experts.
Prior to the consultation, the experts level of expertise is unknown to all the parties. Expertise
can be high, in which case the expert gathers an informative signal with probability p; or low, in
which case the probability is p: Let  denote the prior probability that an expert has high expertise.
The prior probability that the expert be informed is pe = p+(1 )p: His future prospects depend
6This framework is also used in Shin? La¤ont and Tirole (1991) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).
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on the market perception of his ability. Following Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001, 2006a, 2006b),
we assume that reputation is captured by the probability that the market assigns to the expert
being of high expertise, and that his expected utility is linear in this probability. In particular the
expert obtains a premium R; representing the increase in the value of his future revenues, when
being perceived of high expertise with probability 1. The expert is risk neutral so that, letting I
denote the ex-post information of the market on the level of expertise, the objective of the expert
is to maximize the expectation of the following utility function:
U = d+ d+RPr(p = p j I)
where the rst term corresponds to the experts bias, the second to the weight he puts on the social
surplus, the third to his willingness to maintain his reputation. Notice that the utility doesnt
incorporate monetary transfer. While we do not rule out monetary transfers, we assume that there
cannot be made contingent on the report or on the nal decision. Thus they reduce to a xed wage
determined ex-ante.
Our basic model assumes that all the relevant information is divulged. Concretely this means
that the principal discloses publicly the identity of the expert appointed, and also whether the
information provided by the expert is decisive. The game is then the following:
i) in a rst stage, nature draws the value of  and the expert observes the signal s 2 f;; g and
subsequently makes a report r 2 f;; g;
ii) the principal chooses d;
iii) nally, the market observes whether the report is decisive, update the beliefs and payo¤s are
realized.
Strategies
A (pure) strategy for an expert is thus a function mapping the experts private information s
about  into a report. It is fully characterized by the set  of informative signals for which an
informed expert decides to report no information. For other signals, s is truthfully reported. For
conciseness reasons, we focus attention to equilibria where the informed expert reports truthfully
when he is indi¤erent between reporting or not, provided that such an equilibrium exists. This is
innocuous for the case in which the report is public, but it rules out some pathological equilibria
in the case of secret reports.
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The strategy of the authority is a mapping from reports into probabilities of making decision
d = 1. As information is hard and the principal cannot commit ex-ante to the strategy, when
the experts report is decisive, the principal follows the advice and the corresponding decision is
d = 1 (resp. d = 0) if the expert reports the signal  > 0; (resp.  < 0). However, when the expert
reports an uninformative signal ;; then the principal decides according to his posterior beliefs. We
denote by q the probability that the principal chooses the status quo d = 1 when there is no decisive
report.
4 Equilibrium under full transparency
When reports are public, notice that the report is su¢ cient for the market to update its beliefs.
In particular knowledge of the decision adds no information. Moreover the value  for a decisive
report is also irrelevant for determining the market posterior belief, as this doesnt add any useful
information on the type of the expert to the knowledge that he was informed. In other words,
the markets posterior beliefs about the type of the expert is the same for all decisive reports. We
denote by  the reputation gain obtained by an expert when he is decisive. It is proportional to
the di¤erence between the posterior probability that the expert be of high type when the report is
decisive, and the posterior probability when the expert reports no information. Formally, since a
report r = ; occurs if s = ; or s 2 ; the equilibrium value of  is equal to:
 = R [Pr(p = pjs 2 RnNR)  Pr(p = pjs 2 f;g [NR)] > 0 (1)
= R (1  ) p  p
pe (1  pe + pe Pr ()) :
Thus in equilibrium  is positive and decreasing with the probability that  belongs to the set
NR:
While announcing the true  always induces the "correct" decision d = 0 or 1, concealing the
information received may generate an ine¢ cient decision. Comparing the experts utility from
reporting to his utility from not reporting, we see that the experts gain from telling the truth is8<: ( + ) (1  q) +  when   0 q ( + ) +  when  < 0 (2)
where, recall, q is the probability that the decision is d = 1 when there is no decisive report.
In equilibrium, the expert hides information whenever this gain is negative while q maximizes
qE (js 2 f;g [) :
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The way in which the principal acquires information from the expertsreports is twofold. First,
when reporting allows the expert to reach his favorite decision or when misreporting may cause
too much social damage, the expert truthfully reports the information. This enables the principal
to make the right decision. Second, when reporting induces the principal to choose the experts
least favored decision, the expert may withhold the information. Even though the authority cannot
distinguish when the expert misreports or when he has not gathered any information, she gives
more importance to the states of the nature belonging to  when making her decision. Decision
making is therefore always more e¢ cient than without any experts. The e¢ ciency gain depends on
the extent of misreporting.
It is immediate that if the expert is biased against the status quo (  0); there is an equilibrium
where the expert always announces the true signal and the correct decision is taken. The reason
is that the expert cannot induce a more favorable decision by misreporting as this strengthens the
prior idea of the principal. In such an equilibrium, the status quo is chosen if there is no report and
there is no incentive to hide the information. More generally we can easily see that
Lemma 1 There exists an equilibrium where the expert fully reveals his information if and only if
  0 = R (1  ) p ppe(1 pe) :
Proof. Suppose the market anticipates that  = ?: Then q = 1 and  = (?) : The expert
reveals   0 since  is positive and reveals all  < 0 i¤   0:
When the private benets received by an expert if his preferred decision is reached are low, then
the reputation e¤ect induces full revelation of the experts information. Intuitively, as in such cases
the gains from moving a decision are low, it is in the experts interest to enhance his reputation by
reporting truthfully.
4.1 Equilibrium with misreporting
The interesting case arises when the expert is strongly biased in favour of the status quo, so that
the expert may be tempted to hide a negative information. So let us now focus on the case in which
 > 0:
Then an expert informed that the socially optimal decision corresponds to his preferred one
always reports it to the principal. Indeed, making an uninformative report reduces the reputation
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term and doesnt bring any gains in terms of decision. This is the case if s =   0. This is also the
case when     since then the nal decision d = 0 corresponds to his preferred decision. This
denes a lower bound for the values of e¢ ciency gains for which an expert lies:   ( ; 0). But
the expert may be tempted to induce d = 1 by not reporting a negative signal if the social cost of
the status quo is small.
On the range of values between   and 0; the expert doesnt report truthfully when the gain
from inducing the status quo outweighs the cost in terms of reputation. Since reporting induces
d = 0; the gain in (2) is positive and the expert truthfully reports a negative signal if
q ( + )  :
There are two straightforward consequences for equilibrium behavior.
First, in any equilibrium the status quo is chosen with positive probability if the report is not
decisive, q > 0: The reason is that q = 0 would induce the expert to always reveal his signal, which
is not possible in equilibrium by denition of the status quo.
Second, it must be the case that the expert misreports for values  in an interval  = (p; 0) :We
then have  = p (p):
p (p) =
0
1 + p
e
1 pe (F (0)  F (p))
: (3)
This function measures the net reputation gain for an unbiased expert of revealing that the value
is p < 0, when the status quo is a decision d = 1 and beliefs are that (p; 0) is not revealed. Notice
that (?) is the value of the reputation gain when the fact that the expert receives the information
or not is public.
A biased expert will trade-o¤ the reputation gain with the cost of inducing the least preferred
decision d = 0: We then denote by v(p) = E ( j s 2 f;g  (p; 0)) the authoritys expected value
of the decision d = 1 when receiving an uninformative report r = ;. Equilibrium conditions are
then condition 3 along with the following:
i) Either v(p)  0; q = 1; and
 + p = p (p) (4)
ii) or v(p) = 0 and
0 < q =
p (p)
p + 
< 1: (5)
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We refer to the latter equilibrium as a mixed strategy equilibrium.
There is a non-trivial relationship between the experts preference (the bias ) and the reputa-
tion e¤ect which may result in two interesting phenomena: mixed strategy and multiple equilibria.
Random choice by the principal
When the bias  is large and/or the reputation e¤ect is small, the expert would not report a
large set of negative values if it were inducing the principal to choose the status quo. Then no
report would be interpreted as a bad new for the status quo. In this the experts incentives to
report are fostered by reducing the predictability of the decision of the principal making the status
quo less likely. This is only possible if v (p) = 0. Let us remark that v(p) increases with p and
v (0) = E () : Thus there is at most one mixed strategy equilibrium. But it may coexist with pure
strategy equilibria.
When v( 1) < 0; we dene 0 as the (unique) solution of
v(0) = 0:
By convention, set 0 =  1 when v( 1)  0. Then it is immediate that p  0 with equality in
the case of a mixed strategy equilibrium. In particular there is no mixed strategy if v is non-negative
everywhere, which occurs if pe is small.
Multiple equilibria
A key point concerning reputation and reports, is that the more the expert misreports, the
lower the cost in terms of reputation associated with misreporting. This is because it becomes
relatively less likely that a non-decisive expert didnt receive any information. Indeed, the fact that
the expert misreports for some values of the signal reduces the opportunity cost of not reporting
as it becomes relatively less likely that a non-reporting expert didnt receive any information. This
creates an interaction between the experts bias and the reputation e¤ects. More precisely, when
the market anticipates that the set of informative signals for which an informed expert decides to
misreport is large, there is little updating of expertise from misreporting and hence, the reputation
e¤ects are small which reduces the experts incentives to report the true signal. In contrast, when
the market anticipates that the expert reports the truth more often, the loss of reputation faced by
an expert who misreports is larger and the experts incentives to report the true signal increase.
Thus misreporting is to some extent self-reinforcing: the more the market anticipates some
misreporting, the higher the incentives to misreport. This creates the possibility of multiple equi-
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libria. Notice that the structure of equilibria is governed by the shape of the function p ()  : A
pure strategy equilibrium is such that  = p(p)  p and several equilibria may therefore emerge
depending on the variations of this function. An example of multiple equilibria is presented below.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium results if F satises a standard monotone hazard rate condition:
Assumption A For  < 0 : @@
h
f()
F (0) F ()
i
 0:
We show in appendix that this condition implies that the function ( + ) =p () is quasi-
concave.
The following proposition then follows from the previous equilibrium conditions.
Proposition 1 When  > 0; there exists an equilibrium characterized by misreporting for  2
(p; 0) : Under assumption A, the equilibrium is unique9 and:
i) q = 1 and  (p) =  if p (0)  0  ;
ii) q < 1 and p = 0 if p (0)  0 < .
Proof. Notice that for     : p ()  >  >  (0) :Thus either 0 >   and p (0) 0 <
 or there exists p  0 solution of  (p) = : In the former case 0 and q = (0)+0+0 is an
equilibrium, while in the latter case p and q = 1 is an equilibrium.
9Another su¢ cient condition for uniqueness is that the information is dispersed enough so that 0f () < 1 on
( ; 0) :
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We show in appendix that ( + ) =p () 1 is strictly quasi-concave under assumption A with
negative value at   and positive value at 0. Thus there exists a unique solution  2 ( ; 0) to
( + ) =p ()  1 = 0:
The equilibria are depicted in Figure 1 for the case in which  has a slope smaller than 1.

-
6

p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
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wp(0)
wp(0)  0
0 0
s
s
s
Fig. 1: Equilibria with p0 ()  1:
Remark 1 Assumption A dont warrant uniqueness of the equilibrium if  < 0; which would
require that p  be decreasing and not only convex. When  < 0, there may exist two equilibria
with misreporting along with the equilibrium with full reporting. In all that follows, we focus on the
most informative equilibrium, namely the one with full reporting.
4.2 The value of expertise
In order to analyze the e¤ects of the conict of interests on the di¤erent parties, we now examine
how the information revealed by the expert varies with his characteristics. Without expertise the
principals welfare would be E () : The expert then reverts the decision with probability pe if
 < p; inducing a welfare gain   > 0: For  > p there is no welfare gain for the principal since
either d = 1 or the principal is indi¤erent between d = 1 and d = 0: Thus the principals welfare
gain from expertise, gross of the transfer to the expert if there is one, writes as
VP = p
e
0@  pZ
+1
f () d
1A ;
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This term represents the value of the expertise for the principal when she doesnt internalize the
welfare of the expert. With this interpretation we dont face the issue of evaluating the bias.
Another interpretation could be that the principal internalizes the welfare of the expert with a
proper normalization of utilities and transfers. This is developed more extensively in our 2010
working paper.
In any case the welfare gain is that for reported negative values of  the decision is reversed. It is
immediate that the principals welfare increases with p and pe. In particular in the case of multiple
equilibria, wethe welfare gain VP is the highest for the largest value of p; thus when the extent of
misreporting is minimal.10
Assuming a unique pure strategy equilibrium, we then have
Corollary 1 Assume A and p(0)  p   > 0: Then p decreases with  and increases with
R.
Proof. Increasing R shifts  upward which shifts the curve p to the right in the (; p) plan,
similarly for a reduction in the bias. The e¤ect is neutral on p if q < 1 since 0 is independent of
R and :
Thus without surprise, the principal prefers an expert with little bias and high reputation
concerns.
Notice also that if we x the average quality pe, the value of reputation evolves with the
underlying characteristics of the expert as 0, the reputation e¤ect under truthtelling. This latter
depends on the quality di¤erential between the two types of experst and on the information conveyed
by the report of a signal on the expertise:
Corollary 2 Assume A and p(0)  0   > 0: For a xed average quality pe; increasing the
quality di¤erential p  p raises p; the same holds for an increase of  (1  ) :
Proof. The function  increases and thus p decreases when 0 = (1  ) p ppe(1 pe) increases.
Notice that the variance of p is (1  )  p  p2. Thus the interpretation is that due to stronger
reputation e¤ects, the extent of revelation of the experts information increases when the dispersion
10We should point that there is no Pareto ranking of equilibria in this case. The principal prefers the most
informative equilibrium, but the expert prefers the lowest equilibrium value of p:
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of expertise increases. To this extent, larger uncertainty on the quality of the expert improves the
quality of expertise.
The last question is whether the principal prefers better experts. For this notice that for a xed
quality di¤erential and probability , increasing pe has two e¤ects. First it raises the probability
that the expert learn the value : Second, it a¤ects the inference by reducing the likelihood that a
non-decisive report is due to bad luck instead of strategic manipulation of information.
Corollary 3 Assume A and p(0) 0   > 0: Then VP is increasing with the average quality
of the expert if pe > 12(1 F (0)) (holding xed the quality di¤erential and the variance).
Proof. Indeed
p () =
R (1  )  p  p
pe (1  pe + pe (F (0)  F ()))   ;
sign

@p()
@pe

= sign [2pe (1 + F ()  F (0))  1]
It is positive if pe > 1=2 (1  F (0)) implying the  increases and thus p increase with pe:
However  decreases with pe at least for pe  1=2: In this case p decreases which pe so that
the overall e¤ect is ambiguous since increasing pe raises the probability that the expert obtains the
information but reduce the likelyhood that he reveals it. Indeed
@VP
@pe
=  
pZ
+1
f () d   pf (p) pe@
p
@pe
;
which may be positive or negative. Notice that p (p) depends only on the distribution of
 between (p; 0) ; i:e on the restriction of f on (p; 0) : Thus for any distribution such that
2pe (1 + F (p)  F (0))   1 < 0 but @VP@pe > 0 there exists a distribution with the same p and
di¤erent density below p and above zero sucht that @VP@pe < 0:
5 Transparency on the bias
As mentioned in the introduction, most expertise procedures require the expert to report potential
conicts of interest. To address this issue we relax the previous assumptions by assuming that the
bias is private information of the expert. For this purpose, we assume that the prior information
of both the principal and the market on the experts bias is represented by a smooth distribution
whose support is an interval

; 

where  > 0. We also assume that the reputation gain R of the
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expert is known, and not related to the value of . This assumption rules out issues of strategic
manipulation of beliefs on  as analyzed in the work of Sobel (1985) or Morris (2001).
The equilibrium behavior of the expert is the same as before, but now the level p; at which
the expert is indi¤erent between informing the principal or not, depends on the bias , while the
decision of the principal and the reputation e¤ects are based on mean values.
We denote as above  the equilibrium reputation gain from telling the truth and q the prob-
ability that the principal faced with no decisive report chooses the status quo. The expert of type
 truthfully reports a negative  if q ( + )  : Thus there exists a threshold z = =q; such that
the experts report is not decisive if
z    <  < 0: (6)
Notice that the expert may hide information only if z is smaller than , and that the lower the
bias  the more information is revealed. We can then dene the reputation gain as:
u (z) = R [Pr(pjr 6= ;)  Pr(pjr = ;)]
= R

p
pe
   [1  p] + pE [max fF (0)  F (z   ) ; 0g]
1  pe + peE [max fF (0)  F (z   ) ; 0g]

which can be written as
u (z) =
0
1 + p
e
1 peE [max fF (0)  F (z   ) ; 0g]
:
An equilibrium can then be characterized by a pair (qu; zu) such that the condition
u (zu) = quzu (7)
holds and qu is optimal for the principal given that the expert hides the information  2 (zu   ; 0) : The
optimal choice of qu depends on the expected value of  when no information is revealed by the
expert:
E [ j s 2 f;g [ (zu   ; 0)] ;
where the expectation accounts for distribution of both  and : This is increasing with zu and
following the same reasoning as in the previous section, we can dene the critical value z0 (possibly
innite) as the level such that E [ j s 2 f;g [ (zu   ; 0)]  0 if and only if zu  z0: An equilibrium
with qu < 1 is only possible if z0 is nite and zu = z0:
With these notations the equilibrium conditions for an equilibrium write as follows
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i) Either qu = 1 and zu  z0 is the solution of the equation u (zu) = zu;
ii) or zu = z0 > u (z0) and 0 < qu =
u(z0)
z0
 1:
The analysis is thus the same as before but adjusting for the new function u (z) and threshold
z0; which incorporate the uncertainty about the bias in the reputation gain and the principal
decision process.
Proposition 2 Assume that  is uncertain, then there exists an equilibrium and :
1. There is an equilibrium where the expert always reports truthfully his information if and only
if   0:
2. When  > 0 > z0; the expert misreports for  2 (zu   ; 0) where z0  zu < 0:
3. When  > z0  0; the expert misreports for  2 (z0   ; 0)
Proof. Follows from above. Notice that u (z) = 0 if and only if z  : Moreover z0 <
:When  > 0; we must thus have zu < : The function u (z) z is negative at z = , therefore
if u (z0)   z0 > 0 there exist a solution zu to u (zu)   zu = 0: Since u (z) < 0; we have
zu = 
u (z) < 0 if z0 < zu which is possible only if z0 < 0: Moreover if z0 > 0 then z0 is the
unique solution to equilibrium conditions.
This result has some interesting policy implications. First truth telling when  is unknown can
be an equilibrium only if it is one for all possible values of : To this respect lack of transparency
on the bias reduces information revelation on the correct decision.
Moreover when  > 0; the fact that zu <  implies that 0 > u: Hence the fact some expert
dont report truthfully reduces the reputation for all experts. Hence an expert may decide to hide
some information when the bias is uncertain although he would report all the information if his
bias were plublicly knonw. This occurs for an expert with a bias in the range
zu <   0:
To further highlight the e¤ect of transparency, we will now compare for  > 0; the extent
of misreporting by comparing the value p () when  is publicly known with the value zu   
obtained when  is private information. There is more information generated by the expertise with
18
transparency on the bias for values of  such that if zu  < p () : Since zu is constant, we study
the variations of p () + :
To perform the comparison we assume that assumption A holds so that p () is uniquely
dened. Then on the range where p () < 0 we have p () +  = p (p ()) which is decreasing
with  since p () decreases and p () increases. When 0 is nite the minimum is reached
p (0) :When 0 is innite, then p () tends to  1 when  converges to innity, hence p ()+
converges to p ( 1) = lim! 1p () :
We thus concludes that p () +  :
 decreases up to (0) on 0 <  < (0)  0;
 increases from (0) to innity on   (0)  0 (if 0 is nite).
Thus p ()+ is non-monotonic implying a non-trivial comparison between the equilibria with
known bias and unknown bias. We then obtain:
Proposition 3 There exists a non-empty interval (0; 1) such that zu    > p () if and only if
 2 (0; 1), where 0  0 < 1 (with 1 = +1 if 0 =  1).
Proof. To prove the result it su¢ ces to show that zu > min (p () + ) = p (0) :
Suppose that 0 > zu > z0: Notice that
0 = E [ j s 2 f;g [ (z0   ; 0)] > E

 j s 2 f;g [  z0   ; 0
which implies that z0 > 0 + : Moreover
u (z0) >
0
1 + p
e
1 pe max

F (0)  F  z0    ; 0	 = p  z0    > p (0) :
Hence zu = u (zu) > u (z0) > p(0):
A similar reasoning shows that when zu = z0 > u (z0) ; we have z0 > p(0):
If 0 =  1; then p () +  declines and is smaller than zu for  > 0: If 0 is nite, then
p +  reaches a minimum (0NR) then increases which yields the threshold 1:
The surprising feature is that it is not always the case that transparency leads to more revelation
of information. To discuss this issue further let us focus on the case in which pe is not too large
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so that 0 = z0 =  1 and only pure strategy equilibria exist. In this case, transparency reduces
transmission of information for large realizations of the bias  > 0: Thus the overall e¤ect of
transparency of the bias on the principals welfare depends on the distribution of the bias.
Now suppose that the distribution of  increases according to second order stochastic dom-
inance. Then E [max fF (0)  F (z   ) ; 0g] increases so that u (z) move downward implying
that zu decreases. Thus the agent will lie more at all levels of  when the bias is not transparent
and the distribution is shifted toward more bias. However at the same time the probability that
 > 0 increases making it more likely that transparency leads to less reporting. The overall e¤ect
is thus again ambiguous and depends on the mass of types of expert around  = 0:
Notice that when the bias is not fully transparent, a procedure that succeeds in separating the
most biased experts from others would raise u (z) for the remaining types and thus enhanced
the information revealed by less biased experts. This can be achieved if the procedure succeed in
revealing that the bias is above some level, or excluding such types. As, in practice, most of the
experts with the highest expertise are those with the highest conicts of interests, the decision of
the FDA to avoid experts with conicts of interests more important than some upper bound to
participate in advisory committees seems to go in this way. But notice that this entails a cost,
either by giving up some expertise or by increasing the extent of misreporting by these highly
biased experts.
6 Multiple experts
So far we focused on the case of a single expert, but many expertise process can rely on several
experts. Consulting a second expert allows the principal to obtain more information since this
generates additional information when the rst expert is not decisive, but it also a¤ects the behavior
of the rst expert.
We examine these issues by considering the situation where two experts may intervene. Each
expert may learn the value of  or not, thus their signal is the same when they are both informed.
However, they receive this information with independent probabilities. As before we say the ex-
pert/the report is decisive when the report is informative about . For conciseness we assume that
experts di¤ers only by their bias with 1 < 2:
11 Both are common knowledge. To simplify the
11The extension to di¤erent characteristics is starightforward and brings no new conceptual insight.
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analysis further, we assume rst that truthtelling is never an equilibrium if there is only one expert
(i > o). We also focus on situations where the principal always chooses q = 1 if no expert sends
a report. This is the case if vi ( 1)  0 for both i; which we assume here. We nally assume that
assumption A holds. To summarize we assume here
Assumption B : 2 > 1 > 0; j0j is large or innite, assumption A holds.
Whether the presence of the second expert foster or imped information revelation by the rst
expert depends on the precise nature of the interaction and the information used by the market to
update the beliefs on the level of expertise of each expert. Assuming as above that the principal
is able to transmit to the market whether she has received decisive report or not, it remains the
question of whether market knows which reports are decisive and which are not. In other words we
should contrast the situation where the market receives information on each expert independnetly
or whether he receives only collective information. The reason is that while reputation e¤ects
are not a¤ected in the former case, pooling the information on expert may create some free-rider
problem and dilutes the reputation e¤ect. We thus examines the two cases.
6.1 Full transparency and the disciplinary e¤ect
First, assume that the market observes whether the report of expert i = 1; 2 is decisive or not. The
following analysis assumes that experts generate reports simultaneously. This amounts to say that
the identity of the experts is publicly known at the beginning of the process, and that the principal
declares at the end of the process whether a report is decisive, but this is not disclosed until the
decision is announced.
It is immediate that the expert is strategy is again a set i = (i; 0) of non-reported values.
We set i = 0 if the expert report truthfully (i = ?). Morevover since all information is public,
the reputation of an expert is not directly a¤ected by the behavior of the other expert. The expert
i receives a reputation gain i = p(i) by reporting the signal where the function is the same as
in section 4.1 but indexed by the experts identity.
Consider an expert i with i > 0 learning that  < 0: Expert i can anticipate the behavior of
the other expert and thus knows that the signal will be reported if it is below pj : He thus report 
whenever
i 
 
1  pe1j

( + i) ;
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where 1j is an indicator that takes value 1 when the other expert reports the value :
First notice that truthful reporting by one expert cannot be an equilibrium since by assumption
i > 0: However it may be the case that both experts reveals truthfully which occurs when
0  (1  pe)i for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i:
Thus the information revealed by each expert may increase when both are acting simultaneously.
The reason is that transmitting information is less costly since the information may not be used.
This increases the relative weight of reputation in the objective of each expert.
More generally let us dene ci as the solution of
ci = sup f j   0 and p()  (1  pe) ( + i)  0g :
Remind that the equilibrium threshold if there is only expert i is pi solution of
p(pi ) pi = i: The
value ci is the equilibrium threshold if the other expert reports truthfully, and it is larger than the
former, ci > 
p
i :
Given that 1 < 2 we have 
p
1 > 
p
2 and 
c
1  c2: The equilibrium behavior of expert i is then
solution of
8>>><>>>:
i = 
p
i if j  pi ;
i = j if 
p
i  j  ci ;
i = 
c
i if 
c
i  j :
(8)
We then obtain the following equilibrium characterization:
Proposition 4 Assume B and full transparency: The equilibrium with simultaneous expertise is
characterized by
i) (s1; 
s
2) = (
p
1; 
c
2) if 
p
1  c2;
ii) p1  s1 = s2  c2 if p1 < c2:
Each expert reveals more information than if he is the sole expert (and strictly for at least one
expert).
Proof. First we have 1  2 since the reverse inequality would imply p1 = 1 > 2 = c2 which
is not possible. An equilibrium with 1 < 2 must verify 1 = c1 and 2 = 
p
2 which is only possible
if c1 < 
p
2: An equilibrium with 1 = 2 requires 
p
1  1 = 2 = min (c1; c2) which is only possible
if p2  c1:
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The last point follows from ci > 
p
i :
The intuition developed abover thus extends. Using several experts in the context of full
tranapency on each expert contribution enhances the incentive power of reputation e¤ects by re-
ducing the perceived cost of misreporting.
An immediate consequence is that the value of the second expert is larger than the value of the
additional information provided. Indeed the value of the second expert is V sP   V 1P where (using
s2  s1)
V 1P = p
e
0B@  
p
1Z
+1
f () d
1CA ; V sP = pe
0B@  
s
1Z
+1
f () d
1CA+ (1  pe) pe
0B@  
s
2Z
+1
f () d
1CA
We can then decompose that value of the second expert into two parts
V sP   V 1P = (1  pe) pe
0B@  
s
2Z
+1
f () d
1CA+ pe
0B@  
s
1Z
p1
f () d
1CA :
The rst term is the value of the information provided by the second expert. The second term
capture the value attached to enhanced incentives for the rst expet and it is positive whenenever
the second expert is not too biased so that c2 > 
p
1:
When hiring an expert is costly, the principal may decide to consult sequentially. Then the
principal asks the report of expert i, and only if this is not decisive the expertise of expert j: It
is then immediate that the second expert follows the strategy j = 
p
j since he knows that his
report is the only relevant one when he is consulted. Thus he reports less than in the simultaneous
consultation case. Given that best replies are monotonic, this conclusion extends to the other
expert. We then have
Corollary 4 A simultaneous consultation of experts leads to (weakly) more information revealed
than a sequential consultation.
Proof. If expert 1 is consulted rst, then we have i = 
p
i for both experts. If expert 2 is
consulted rst we have 1 = 
p
1 and 2 = min (
p
1; 
c
2) : In all cases the level i is smaller than in the
simultaneous case for both experts.
The consequence of this corollary is that when expertise is costly, there is some ambiguity on the
optimal timing. Indeed a sequential consultation leads to less information but saves on expertise
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costs. More precisely let w be the cost of an expertise assumed to be xed an independent of the
expert.12 Let V ijP be the gross welfare under a sequential procedure starting with expert i: Then
we have
V 12p = V
1
P + (1  pe) pe
0B@  
p
2Z
+1
f () d
1CA  V 21p = V 1P + (1  pe) pe
0B@ 
min(p1;
c
2)Z
+1
f () d
1CA  V sP
Denoting W ijP = w

2  pe + pe

F (0)  F

iji

the expected cost we also have W sp = 2w
and
W 21  W 12p = wpe (F (p1)  F (min (p1; c2)))  0
W sp  W 21P = wpe (1  F (0) + F (min (p1; c2))) > 0
In a sequential timing, more information is revealed if the most biased expert (expert 2) is
consulted rst, as he is constrained by the next expertise. In terms of cost, the order is reversed.
Simultaneous consultation is the most costly as the cost is spend twice, while the less costly proce-
dure is when expert 1 is consulted rst as this maximizes the chance of obtaining the information
with only one expert.
One conclusion is however that when the di¤erence between the two experts is not too large,
we will have p1 < 
c
2: Then W
12
p =W
21
p since a sequential consultation starting with expert 2 leads
to 2 = 
p
1 and thus the same probability of obtaining the information in the rst round than the
reverse timing. Moreover V 12p < V
21
p whenever 
p
1 > 
p
2: It follows that when experts preferences
are not too far apart, the optimal sequential timing is to start with the most biased expert (expert
2).
Another conclusion from the analysis is that the sequential procedure with the expert 2 consulted
rst may be subject to a time inconsistency issue. Indeed the principal may wish to commit to a
second expertise in order to raises the incentives of the rst expert, but ex-post she will be tempted
to save the cost and renege on the commitment if the cost is larger than the value of the additional
information. To see that notice that the value of the second expert ex-ante is (assuming c2 > 
p
1)
V 21P   V 1P  
 
W 21p   w

= (1  pe) pe
0B@  
p
1Z
+1
f () d
1CA 
12 In many public expertise procedures, the cost is governed by rigid administrative rules.
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6.2 Ambiguity on the decisive expert and dilution of incentives
Things may be quite di¤erent whenever the market is not fully informed about the contribution of
each expert. Indeed, when the market information is coarse, it may fail to attribute the credit of a
decisive report to the correct expert with the result of a dilution of the reputation e¤ect between
the two experts. Then reputation become a collective good for the experts, raising the issue of
moral hazard in teams and poor incentives (Holsmtrom, 1982). To see that we extend the model
by assuming that while the principal reveals whether she had access to a decisive report, she does
not reveal ex-post the identity of the decisive expert. This would be the case for procedures that
report the names of the expert and where the decision of the principal is "motivated", meaning
that the principal attaches to the decision the reasoning and elements that justify it. In this case,
one can see whether some specialized information was used but may not see which expert provided
this information.
Thus the market observes the decision and whether some expert were decisive.13 Since the mar-
ket cannot infer which expert was decisive, the information used by the market to assess reputation
becomes a joint production for the two experts. Now expert i; anticipating that expert j reveals
 < j ; chooses to announce his information  < 0 if 
1  pe1j

(i      i)  0:
where i = m (i; j) is the reputation gain of expert i when the market knows that one expert
reported a negative value of : This writes as:
m (i; j) =
 (pF (i) + p
eF (j)  ppemin (F (1) ; F (2)))
peF (i) + peF (j)  (pe)2min (F (1) ; F (2))
   (1  p+ p (F (0)  F (i)))
1  pe + pe (F (0)  F (i))
Since only the joint report is relevant for the expert, his report matters only when  is not
reported by the other expert, which occurs with probability 1  pe1j . Conditional on no report
by the other expert, the incentives to report are unchanged compared to the case with one expert.
But the reputation gain i is a¤ected. The e¤ect on equilibrium behaviors then depends on the
comparison between the reputation gain with one and two experts.
Since the market is not able to infer which expert produced the decisive report, the individual
reputation gain should be smaller when there is a second expert. Indeed we show below that
13We exmaine in our 2010 working paper the case where only the decision is observed.
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m (i; j) < 
p(i): The meaning of this result is that, in all pure strategy equilibria, hiring a
second expert reduces the rst experts incentives to reveal his information when it is unfavorable.
We thus obtain that
Proposition 5 Asumme B and the identity of the decisive experts is not public, then each expert
reveals strictly less information when there are two experts than if he is the sole expert..
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that m (i; j) < p(i) or
 (pF (i) + p
eF (j)  ppemin (F (1) ; F (2)))
peF (i) + peF (j)  (pe)2min (F (1) ; F (2))
<
p
pe
which holds provided that pe < p. Then assumption A ensures that on   pi : m (; j)  i <
p ()     i  0: Hence in any equilibrium of the multiple expert game we have i > pi :
Thus consulting two experts raises the number of sources of information, which raises the chance
to learn that the status quo is not the correct decision, but il also undermine the incentives of experts
by diluting the reputtaion e¤ects between the two experts. The value of the second expert may
then not be positive. Indeed denoting mi < 
p
i the threshold levels, the value V
m
P for the principal
is
V mP = V
1
P + (1  pe) pe
0B@  
m
2Z
+1
f () d
1CA  pe
0B@  
p
1Z
m1
f () d
1CA :
The second bracket term is positive so that the value of the second expert is smaller than the value
of the additional information provided, and can even be negative.
Considering the timing of the procedure, notice that provided that the market information is
not altered, a sequential consultation of experts would result in the same strategies by experts and
thus would not alter the level of informtaion transmited (but would be less costly). However it
most likely that a sequential consultation would alter the nature of the market information and of
the reputation e¤ect. For example if the names of experts and the order of consultation are public
information, then the sequential timing reveals the identity of the decisive expert (they can be only
one). Even if the order is not public, when he is decisive, the rst expert benets from a strong
reputation gain p (i) since he is known to be the sole expert. This suggests that a sequential
timing should be preferred in this case.
26
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the e¢ ciency of (hard) information transmission between some biased experts
and a decision maker, focusing on reputation mechanisms for experts. Biased experts have an
incentive to conceal unfavoured pieces of information. There is a complex interaction between
reputation e¤ects and these incentives, because the reputation e¤ects are reinforced when the
incentives to conceal are weakened.
In this context, hiring experts with a lower bias in favour of the status quo improves the
e¢ ciency of the decision. Moreover the amount of information revealed by experts increases as
the information of the market on the details of expertscontributions increases (we develop this
point at more length for the single expert case in our working paper). But an interesting result is
that it is not always the case that transparency on the expertsbias leads to more revelation of
information.
Finally we show that the impact of consulting another expert on the amount of information
concealed by the expert depends on the information a¤ecting reputation. The incentives to reveal
information are strenghthened when information allows the market to identify each experts con-
tribution, so that reputation e¤ects are independent between the experts. But when the market
observes a coarser information, reputation e¤ects are interdependent, in which case the incentives
to reveal information are weakened. The optimal timing of consultation depends also on the nature
of the information revealed to the market under the di¤erent timing.
When the expertsreports are public, the presence of another expert induces an expert to report
more truthfully. However, this result is reversed in the case of secret reports. The intuitive result
that hiring an expert constrains other experts to reveal the truth is therefore only true when there
is public disclosure of reports. The optimal timing with public reports depends on the costs of
expertise while a sequential timing is optimal with secret reports.
Notice that the sequential policy raises time consistency issues. For instance, in the case of
public reports, the principal may be tempted to announce that she will consult a second expert
and then renege on the promise and not consult the second expert. The reason is that committing
to consult raises the incentives of the rst expert and thus has a value larger than just the value of
the information provided by the second expert. Similarly, in the case of secret reports, it may be
optimal to commit not to consult the other expert, but then to renege on the promise. The reason
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is again that such a commitment allows to raise the incentive on the second expert.
One aspect that we left aside is that the bias itself may be a¤ected by the information disclosed
This is the case when the expert anticipate some future rents from the relationship with an interested
party and fear that a negative report will trigger some form of retaliation by this party. Also the
expert may be tempted to misreport if this raises his future prospect with this party. In other words
reputation e¤ects on quality of experts may conict with other forms of reputation concerns.14
8 Appendix
Reputation gain . We will rst compute the gain of reputation when when the expert announces
an informative report for  2  = (p; 0) :
Pr(pjr = ;) =  (1  p+ pPr ())
1  pe + pe Pr ()
Pr(pjr = ) = p
pe
This gives
p() =
0
1 + p
e
1 pe (F (0)  F ())
:
Quasi-concavity of ( + ) =p()  1. Let
g () = ( + )

1 +
pe
1  pe (F (0)  F ())

Then ( + ) =p()   1 = g () =0   1: It su¢ ce to show that g is quasi-concave. The rst and
second derivatives are
g0 () =

1 +
pe
1  pe (F (0)  F ()  ( + ) f ())

g00 () =
pe
1  pe
  2f ()  ( + ) f 0 ()
Notice tht g00 is negative if f 0  0: Suppose that g0 ()  0 and f 0 () < 0: Then F (0) F ()f() <  + 
and
2f ()  ( + ) f 0 () <  2f ()  F (0)  F ()
f ()
f 0 () :
14 In our model one could think for exemple that the expert cares about signalling his bias  to a third party by
not reporting.
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But under assumption A; f () + F (0) F ()f() f
0 ()  0:Thus
g00 () <  2f ()  F (0)  F ()
f ()
f 0 () <  f () < 0:
This implies that g is decreasing on an interval (0; 0) and increasing on
  ; 0 :
Moreover g ( ) =0   1 =  1 and g (0) = =0   1 > 0:
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